Reflections on the Influence og Philosophy on Criminal Law by Frisch, Wolfgang
Reflections on the Influence of Philosophy on 
Criminal Law
Explaining Uniformity and Variety o f Criminal Law in Europe 
By Wolfgang Frisch1
Abstract
Among the cultural factors that have shaped the crim inal codes o f European 
states, philosophical thinking obviously has a foremost position. The essay indi­
cates the common philosophical roots o f European crim inal codes. It shows that 
the common philosophical ground o f these codes is the result o f ideas developed 
especially by the philosophies o f natural law and rational law and the philosophy 
o f enlightenment. These philosophies have form ed substantive crim inal law, the 
codes o f crim inal procedure, today’s theory ofpunishment and general principles 
o f substantive crim inal law as well as the catalogue o f offences and important 
procedural principles. They have thus created important elements o f uniformity. 
Nonetheless, there is still considerable variety in the crim inal codes o f European 
states. This essay gives examples o f such variety and illuminates their back­
ground. It shows especially that variety begins where the guidance o f philosoph­
ica l thinking ends. Here, other cultural factors can exert an influence. Finally, 
the essay deals briefly with the question o f whether philosophy can still be a 
guide today -  when we try to decide whether and to what extent we should har­
monize the crim inal codes o f Europe or maintain variety.
Introduction
Comparative jurisprudence shows that there is, despite much variety, a common 
stock o f crim inal law beyond the borders o f particular European states. For some 
people this stock is the basis and the nucleus for further harmonization or stand­
ardization o f crim inal law in Europe. Others consider this common supply to be a 
sufficient guarantee o f legal unity in European’s crim inal law -  they judge the 
remaining variety beyond this common stock not negative but as something that 
should be maintained.
I am not intending to intervene in this current discussion, at least not directly. I 
would like to treat another topic, a topic currently less discussed. I am interested 
in the ingredients o f this common stock and in the forces which have shaped it. 
Since this common base is limited, the question also arises where the common
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stock ends and where variety begins -  and why it has come and could come to 
that variety.
These questions are not only academic and o f scientific interest. They are ob­
viously also interesting from a practical perspective such as the possibility and 
the desirability o f more legal uniformity in those fields o f crim inal law which are 
currently still characterized by variety. Whether uniformity in those fields is at­
tainable and desirable depends decisively on the reasons and the forces respon­
sible for uniformity and -  on the other side -  standing behind the variety current­
ly to be found.
O f course, it is not possible to show the whole background o f the common Eu­
ropean stock o f crim inal law in a short essay, and even less that o f variety. I have 
to leave aside reflections on legal anthropology as well as on the roots in Roman 
or Canon law.2 I would like to restrict and to concentrate my considerations on 
the influence o f philosophy, especially o f philosophical insights into crime, pun­
ishment and procedure. This influence is enormous: It is essentially the result o f 
philosophical reflections on crime and punishment that there are certain common 
characteristics in the crim inal laws o f European countries today, basic character­
istics in the form o f common principles as well as in the form o f common institu­
tions. On the other side, differences can be found particularly in fields where 
philosophical insights did not and do not lead to a single acceptable solution -  
here pragmatic aspects, traditions and other forces can work.
I. Uniformity created by Philosophy
1. Philosophical Reflections on Basic Questions o f Crim inal Law  
The enormous influence o f philosophical insights on European crim inal justice 
systems becomes already visible i f  you look at the basic questions o f crim inal 
law.
a) Legitimation o f Crim inal Law
One o f the central topics o f crim inal law is the question o f legitimation: What jus­
tifies to punish a person because o f a certain behaviour and where are the lim its 
o f justifiable punishment?
To answer this question, in particular the philosophy o f natural rights and o f 
rational law (Naturrecht, Vemunftrecht) and the philosophy o f enlightenment 
have worked out fundamental and pathbreaking insights -  philosophers like 
Hobbes, Grotius, Locke and Pufendorf later on Montesquieu, Rousseau, Voltaire, 
Beccaria, Kant and Hegel stand exemplarily for that. Their reflections on the 
foundation, the legitimation and the raison d’etre o f the state had broken with
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long accepted theocratical foundations justifying the state as an institution to real­
ize an order w illed by God. Such conceptions were replaced by foundations tak­
ing their origin from the human being, his needs and his reason.3 In this sight, the 
state is a rationally grounded association firm ly pursuing earthly objectives -  
above all the protection o f its citizens against harm to their individual and collec­
tive goods. Crim inal law is now conceived accordingly: Punishment and crim inal 
law, increasingly judged as grave interventions in human rights, are restricted to 
these objectives o f an earthly legitimated state -  and therefore can only be justi­
fied in order to protect against harm to rights and goods o f individuals and soci­
ety.4
Later on jurists and philosophers have elaborated this basic approach and put 
it into concrete form,5 so that we can already find the first legal enactments at the 
end o f the eighteenth century -  for instance in article 5 o f the French Declaration 
o f Human Rights: “La lo i n’a le droit de defendre que les actions nuisibles a la 
societe.”6 Nowadays, this approach is common good o f crim inal law in all Euro­
pean states, even though expressed through different terms and principles like the 
principle o f “Rechtsguterschutz” or the harm principle, etc.7 Punishment o f mere­
ly immoral or dishonourable behaviour, o f breaking with the contents o f a reli­
gion or o f blasphemy has vanished, at least on the whole. Attempts to re-enact 
those crimes, like the reintroduction o f parts o f the Sharia in some Islamic States, 
w ill cause storms o f indignation in the European public -  a proof o f the effective­
ness o f the philosophical ideas just mentioned.
b) Theory o f Punishment
There is a second central issue o f crim inal law on which philosophical reflections 
had a clarifying, forming and -  at the end -  standardizing effect: the question o f 
the rationale o f punishment.
Inspite o f some reflections on this topic already in the philosophy o f ancient 
world,8 the fundamentals are formulated by the philosophy o f rational and natural 
law,9 the philosophy o f enlightenment10 and philosophers and jurists elaborating 
the insights found out in these periods. To those philosophical approaches we do 
not only owe the insight that the real problem o f punishment is the reason for its 
imposition -  because the threat o f punishment prior to the incriminated act can 
hardly intend something different than prevention o f offences by dissuading po­
tential offenders. The philosophy o f enlightenment and the follow ing discussion 
have also precisely marked the conceivable rationales concerning just this impos­
ition o f punishment. Although most o f the philosophers o f enlightemnent justified 
punishment with its benefit, they also pointed out the dangers especially o f gen-
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eral deterrence and o f a punishment purely oriented towards the needs o f individ­
ual prevention.11 A t the same time, the philosophy o f enlightenment, above all 
Montesquieu and Beccaria, emphasized the necessity o f some proportion be­
tween crime and punishment.12 Kant completed these reflections with his famous 
closing remark: It is not enough that punishment is useful for the public, it has to 
be, above all, just and justified with regard to the convicted person.13 These philo­
sophical approaches and the follow ing discussions have worked out the funda­
mentals o f today’s view o f punishment -  a view o f punishment which might be 
seen as common basis o f European crim inal justice systems, i f  you leave aside 
some details.
From this perspective, punishment is -  firstly -  a response to the offence 
committed. It is, secondly, oriented towards the severity o f the offence committed 
and its importance for the violated legal order. And it is, thirdly, imposed on an 
offender to demonstrate that the threat o f punishment is serious, to show the val­
idity o f the legal order and thereby to prevent, as far as possible, in this way crime 
in future. This moderate view o f things has meanwhile succeeded also in those 
states which were not spared from relapses into general preventive conceptions o f 
deterrence or did sympathize for some time with conceptions o f punishment ori­
ented above all towards the idea o f reforming the offender.
2. Philosophical Reflections on the Theory o f Crime and the General 
Principles
Beyond the questions o f legitimation o f crim inal law and the rationale o f punish­
ment, philosophical thinking has influenced, above all, the general part o f crim­
inal law, and here especially the general theory o f crime.
a) Theory o f Crime -  General Requirements
In the ancient folk laws we can only find descriptions o f those unwanted events 
or o f behaviour that should be avenged by punishment or other sanctions -  in 
other words, the catalogue o f offences or the special part o f crim inal law today. 
Reflections on general requirements o f crime almost lacked completely in those 
times -  such issues were discussed, i f  at all, ad hoc and casuistically, especially in 
the context o f manslaughter and bodily harm.14 It had been again, above all, phil­
osophers and philosophically educated jurists,15 also theologians, who specifical­
ly asked the question why it is legitimate at a ll to hold a person responsible for an 
unwanted event -  and: which principal requirements have to be fu lfilled to do so. 
The results o f these reflections found expression in the so-called principles o f im­
putation, ascription or attribution -  for instance, Pufendorfs famous theory o f
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imputation16 -  and have directly or via processes o f reception (or adaption) 
coined today’s general theory and principles o f crime.
Theories o f imputation have, for instance, worked out the act requirement as a 
reason and a lim it to hold a person responsible for an unwanted event (caused by 
such acts). They have, secondly, shown that only certain persons can be held ac­
countable for unwanted acts and events: Only those persons who are able to de­
cide reasonably can be held responsible for what they have done -  this ability is, 
in other words, a central general requirement for qualifying harm to others (or 
other bad events) as the work o f a person and to attribute (impute) it to her. Third­
ly, theories o f imputation contain first specific reflections on facts or situations 
which exclude qualifying an act or an event as a crime -  like acting to protect 
against unlawful attacks, acting to save threatened goods in emergency situations 
or the circumstance that the affected person has consented to the affecting act. A ll 
that can be found already in Pufendorf s eight volumes “De jure naturae et genti­
um” (1672).17
The philosophy o f enlightenment has continued and deepened these approach­
es, and in the last two centuries philosophers and jurists have developed them fur­
ther and put them into a concrete form by clarifying them against the background 
o f an extensive illustrating material.18 Being the result o f unprejudiced philosoph­
ical reflections, the pillars o f that theory o f crime, especially o f its general re­
quirements, endured and were suitable to show the way for further development. 
So today’s theories o f crime in European countries coincide in most general re­
quirements o f crime and its essential institutions, i f  you leave aside once more 
some particular developments,19 especially in details.
b) General Principles o f Substantive Law
Not only the theory o f crime has philosophical roots, especially concerning the 
requirements and exclusions o f crime. Important general principles o f crim inal 
law go back to philosophical reflections, too, or have been given a philosophical 
foundation.
An  example o f that is the maxim “nullum crimen sine lege” , gaining strength 
in the age o f enlightenment, meaning that a person must not be punished unless 
the conduct was, prior to the act, defined as crim inal (that is: forbidden and 
threatened by punishment). You can already find this principle in Hobbes ’ “Levia­
than” ; later on Bentham’s “Principles o f Penal Law” and Feuerbach's famous 
“ System o f Common Penal Law” gave reasons for the principle.20
Another example o f principles with philosophical roots is the principles gov­
erning the treatment o f different kinds o f mistake (error), for instance mistake o f
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fact and mistake o f law. Being roughly known already in Roman and Canon 
Law,21 the distinction and the principles building on it got a deeper foundation 
and were further developed above all by philosophers like Pufendorf, Hegel and 
others.22 Their reflections on the treatment o f different types o f error contain al­
ready the most essential aspects o f today’s theories.
A  further instance o f those principles and insights with obviously philosoph­
ical background is the distinction between grounds only excluding punishment 
and grounds giving rights and revoking the quality o f wrongdoing. Pufendorf and 
his contemporaries did not yet know this distinction exactly.23 We owe it to the 
critical philosophy and its thirst for knowledge and can find it there in the famous 
dispute over a so-called right o f necessity between Kant and Hegel. Hegel tried to 
give reasons for such a right, though it had to be strongly restricted in his opinion, 
too.24 Kant denied a right o f necessity emphatically: How, he asked, should a situ­
ation o f danger or need give you a right to use and damage the goods o f a person 
who has done nothing bad to you? In his opinion, such behaviour was not justi­
fied. There were only good reasons not to punish it.25,26 This distinction between 
grounds revoking wrongdoing by giving rights and those which only excuse or 
exclude punishment was increasingly accepted in the course o f the nineteenth and 
the twentieth century; nowadays it is a p illar o f most European crim inal laws.
It is not possible to give further examples o f the influence o f philosophical 
thinking on general theory o f crime here. Instead, we should also take a look at 
the catalogue o f offences, that means the so-called special part o f crim inal law, 
and crim inal procedure -  not least to counter the objection that the connections 
between philosophy and general theory o f crime have no equivalent in other parts 
o f the crim inal law.
3. Philosophical Reflections on the Catalogue o f Offences 
Just like the general theory o f crime, the catalogues o f crimes in European crim­
inal codes have a philosophical foundation and owe their common core essential­
ly to philosophical reflections -  although it is true that the influence o f philoso­
phy is weaker here, and much has to do with tradition.
The appreciation o f fundamental human rights and the restriction o f the power 
o f the state on ensuring these rights and goods and protecting them from in­
fringement had made untenable a series o f offences o f medieval and early mod­
em times crim inal law, especially offences against God, church and religion. 
Thomasius in Germany, Montesquieu and Voltaire in France and Beccaria in Ita­
ly were the most famous critics o f such offences.27 According to that criticism, 
these offences vanished in the course o f time. A t the same time, the programmat-
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ic restriction o f the authority o f the state and o f crim inal law onto the guarantee o f 
rights and goods o f individuals and the community and onto their protection from 
harm and intervention contained a clear guideline for building up a legitimate 
criminal law: It was only necessary to connect this program with insights o f phil­
osophy concerning both, the catalogue o f individuals’ rights in need o f protection 
and the goods o f community which are indispensable to ensure and to preserve 
such rights. These insights made it clear what crim inal law had to protect and, on 
the other hand, what it was restricted to: the guarantee and protection o f life, o f 
bodily integrity, o f freedom and property, alongside with the guarantee o f im­
portant community goods like the existence o f state as such, the integrity o f the 
authority o f the state, a functioning administration and jurisdiction and some 
other indispensable goods and functions. The crim inal codes o f European states 
have accordingly acted and concentrated on this in a long and differently running 
development.
But there is not only conformity regarding a certain core o f offences and the 
lim itation o f goods which can be protected by means o f crim inal law. Uniform ly 
judged are today, at least on the whole, also the ranks o f these goods, their hier­
archy, and what is follow ing from that for the question how harm to these goods 
should be punished. In these fields the philosophy o f enlightenment has — in turn­
ing from divinely ordained conceptions o f law to human beings and their needs -  
also provided decisive standards and thus ensured the transition; Montesquieu and 
Beccaria were pioneers here, too.28 Finally, there is conformity also with regard 
to another important point in European crim inal codes: Not a ll behaviour touch­
ing goods is worth to be prevented by punishment and justifies its use. Punish­
ment as a serious intervention into individual rights has to be confined to severe 
intrusions into rights o f others. This “ultima ratio” function, again a central postu­
late o f enlightenment, has been formulated very clearly by Beccaria, Montes­
quieu and Voltaire
For a long time, enlightened crim inal law did correspond to these postulates 
by restricting crim inal law to offences requiring both, a real harm to a legally pro­
tected good and a specific mental relation o f the offender to his wrongdoing -  the 
latter in form o f intent or specific types o f knowledge. It is true that today’s crim­
inal codes are reaching further -  they contain more and more offences requiring 
only negligence, and modem legislators increasingly penalize also kinds o f con­
duct even though there is no real harm, for instance dangerous or risky actions. 
However, there is proof showing that the idea o f restricting crim inal law to grave 
harmful behaviour is still felt to be an obligation. Exemplary for that are intensive 
efforts to justify such extensions o f crim inal law, especially into the field o f risky
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or preparatory behaviour -  the argument, for instance, that an efficient protection 
o f rights and goods could not be ensured without forbidding and punishing such 
behaviour in various fields.30
4. Philosophical Reflections on Crim inal Procedure
The philosophy o f rational law and o f enlightenment brought also a real transition 
in the field o f crim inal procedure, and at the same time, provided a common Eu­
ropean stock o f procedural institutions and principles.
a) Status o f the Accused -  Restricting the Power o f the State
Not only torture was incompatible with the recognition o f each individual as a 
person with inalienable fundamental rights and the restriction o f the authority o f 
the state -  passionately criticized by philosophers like Thomasius, Beccaria and 
Voltaire?1 It was already incompatible w ith such positions to treat the accused as 
a mere object o f investigations. Regarded as a person with fundamental rights, the 
accused had to become an autonomous subject o f procedure whose rights had to 
be respected in all phases o f proceedings. Hence certain methods o f investigation 
were rejected by philosophers, and procedural forms were claimed by them to 
preserve the rights o f the defendant32 and to bring them in line with the interest o f 
the community in convicting and sentencing the real perpetrator. A t the same 
time, coercive measures like custody, search or seizure were considered to be le­
gitimate only when certain conditions are observed.33 Other reform claims and 
institutes o f law to restrict and control the power o f the state were the demand for 
judicial independence,34 the demand for public court proceedings (hearings) and 
for participation o f people in crim inal jurisdiction.3̂  The principles and conse­
quences o f this enlightened thinking found expression in important codifications 
at the end o f the eighteenth and the beginning nineteenth century (like the Code 
pénal and the Code d’ instruction crim inelle) the spirit o f which spread all over 
Europe and partially even found its way into constitutions o f the nineteenth cen­
tury. According to this, most o f the European codes o f crim inal procedure had 
been adapted to the new ideas and principles at the end o f the nineteenth cen­
tury.36
b) Institutions and Principles to fin d  out the Truth
But philosophy did not only provide a new status for the accused. It also influ­
enced the way to find or better: to reconstruct truth in crim inal proceedings. C rit­
ical philosophy trying to analyse “what can I know?” and “how can I recognize 
what is (and what was)?” had also sensitized to reflect the methods o f finding out
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the truth in crim inal proceedings. Against this critical background, the methods 
and rules that had been applied to find out the truth in crim inal proceedings until 
the end o f the eighteenth century in most European countries appeared obviously 
unsuitable. The role o f the judge as investigator, prosecutor and judge in one per­
son made prejudiced, and the rules o f evidence were incompatible with insights 
o f epistemology and the methods o f natural and empirical sciences. A  further 
main evil o f the ancient crim inal proceedings consisted in the fact that the court 
often knew the case only from the records. Sensational wrong judgements con­
firmed the unsuitability o f those proceedings. So it was only a question o f time 
until these pillars and parts o f ancient crim inal proceedings were replaced by in­
stitutions, methods and principles which were better suited to find out the truth 
and to ensure a fair judgement. The institutions we owe to philosophical reflec­
tions on these topics are well-known: Role allocations, especially the distinction 
between prosecutor and judge/7 are to be mentioned here as well as the principle 
o f oral proceedings and o f immediacy38 that obliges the judge to see evidence dir­
ectly and not only by hearsay.
Besides these aspects, some other well-known principles and institutions be­
long to this firm stock o f crim inal procedure in Europe having its roots in philo­
sophical reflections. I only mention the presumption o f innocence/4 the right o f 
defence and to a fair trial or institutes like “res judicata” or the right to appeal.40 
This philosophically rooted common European stock o f crim inal procedural law41 
is most impressively symbolized today by the guarantees enshrined in the Euro­
pean Convention o f Human Rights supervised and ensured by the European 
Court o f Human Rights.42
II. Variety beyond Philosophical Guidance
O f course, the crim inal codes o f European states do not only contain common in­
stitutions and common philosophical ground. There exist also a lot o f differences, 
and this not only in unimportant details.
1. Some Examples
Differences can already be found in the field o f general doctrines o f crime. The 
central categories to qualify behaviour to be a crime, for instance, differ in the 
countries o f common law from the categories used in continental European crim­
inal codes. The inner or mental side o f crime, the mens-rea component, is also 
seen quite differently in both these legal systems.43 Self-defence, necessity and 
other legal grounds o f justification or excuse coincide in a common core, but the 
width o f rights or excuses differs considerably.44 Further divergences exist in
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treatment o f mistakes and in cases when more than merely one person may be 
held accountable for a crime. Here, different basic conceptions compete -  namely 
the qualification o f all involved persons as perpetrators (so called “Einheitstater”) 
and those conceptions distinguishing between perpetrators (or principals) and 
participants (secondary participation). Moreover, there are considerable diver­
gences between those crim inal codes which distinguish in the mentioned way, 
because they are using partially different subdivisions.4' Looking at the treatment 
o f attempt, one can see that there are different national answers how to treat the 
cases o f impossibility (“untauglicher Versuch” ) or o f withdrawal -  not every­
where withdrawal is acknowledged to exclude punishment. Just as different are 
national answers to the punishability o f omissions. Finally, sentences provided 
for in national codes o f crim inal law are partially also very different, and not less 
different are the guidelines for sentencing -  some crim inal laws contain precise 
rules destining the punishment almost in a mathematically exact way,46 others 
give their judges wide ranges o f discretion.
The differences are rather increasing in the field o f particular offences. O f 
course, there is a common catalogue o f rights and goods being protected against 
grave harm in all European crim inal codes. But even this common ground be­
comes relative since the protection even o f these rights and goods is effected by 
differently shaped types o f crime. Where harm to a certain good (for instance life 
or freedom o f bodily harm) is distributed among several offences, the internal 
distribution is often different -  for instance, aggravations and mitigations are con­
structed and arranged differently. Further differences concern the external lim its 
o f conduct forbidden and punished to protect certain goods. Differences exist 
here especially in the fields o f offences against property and against common 
goods or values, for instance concerning fraud or forgery o f documents.47 More­
over, there are, especially in the fields o f middle and petty crim inality, offences 
that are known only in some o f European crime codes -  for instance failure to 
render aid (or to give assistance).48 Considerable are the differences, finally, con­
cerning the height o f punishment threatened in the national criminal codes. Not 
only the general level o f punishment is differing here, the threat o f punishment 
for particular offences and the statutory range o f punishment differs as well.
The codes o f criminal procedure confirm the impression o f uniformity and var­
iety. The common stock already mentioned is faced by a multitude o f differences 
-  actually not only in details, but also in important and principal questions.49 I 
w ill only mention four issues o f divergence. Firstly, in some states prosecution 
and bringing a charge are governed by the principle o f compulsory prosecution 
whereas other states prefer the idea o f discretion; but in most instances both prin-
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ciples are simply the starting point, in reality divergent mixtures are predominant. 
Secondly, fact-finding and taking o f evidence sometimes lie in the hands o f par­
ties with contrasting roles, prosecutor, accused and defence; other codes o f pro­
cedure provide for an officia l duty o f the court to find the facts and to take evi­
dence. Thirdly, the final decision lies predominantly in the hands o f a court 
staffed solely or at least partly with professional judges; but there are still some 
countries where, at least in certain cases, a jury decides whether the accused is 
guilty or not. Fourthly, the judgement closing the instance can normally be ap­
pealed against, but, again, there are considerable differences concerning the num­
ber and the details o f appeals.
2. Reasons: Lim ited Guidance o f Philosophical Insights
Where do all these and a couple o f further differences come from? And where do
they arise especially? -  It is not d ifficu lt to answer these questions.
Differences are always possible where a rational or philosophical reflection on 
problems, though acknowledging certain common values and starting points, ob­
viously leads to more than only one answer. When reason and sense o f justice al­
low different solutions, other issues can get influence and are, strictly speaking, 
even needed to come to a final decision. Issues taking influence in those cases are 
above all pragmatic aspects and the greater compatibility o f a solution with trad­
ition, with national preferences or other parts o f the national law.50 Experience, 
including the experience gained in other countries, plays an important role in this 
context, too. The legal solution, finally found in this way, not seldom shows fea­
tures o f an experiment -  especially when experience is lacking or contradictory 
and the legal solution is determined by preferences o f the legislators. Nonethe­
less, i f  it stands the test in the course o f time it w ill become part o f the well 
known stock o f national law which w ill be only reluctantly given up again.
Let me illustrate this by means o f the question how to deal with the offences 
committed by several participants: Justice and reason and with that philosophical 
reflections forbid, o f course, to impose equal sentences on persons which have 
been involved in the offence in a quite different way. But whether, in cases with 
several involved persons, all o f them should be called perpetrators (and only get 
different sentences) or whether only a part o f them should be called perpetrators 
and the others participants is not a question about which reason and justice allow 
only one answer; this applies even more to the question how detailed these main 
figures should be subdivided. Accordingly, different answers can be found in Eu­
ropean crim inal codes51 -  depending on, among other aspects, how desirable it 
seems to be for a national community to make symbolic distinctions already in
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the conviction and to which extent those special figures are already available and 
rooted in general thinking.
Another example for different solutions is the legislative decision for fact­
finding and taking evidence either by means o f an adversarial procedure or ex of­
ficio  investigation.52 Both conceptions have advantages and disadvantages; it is 
not possible to say that one is definitely better. Whether a legislator w ill decide 
for one or the other model depends above all on how he weighs advantages and 
disadvantages, which status he concedes to these aspects and i f  he thinks it would 
be possible to sufficiently compensate the disadvantages o f a model.53
III. Prospects: Variety and Uniformity as an Object of Philosophy
W ith these reflections I have reached the end o f my sketch on the importance o f 
philosophy for the common stock o f the crim inal law o f the European states. The 
considerations might have shown how much today’s crim inal codes in Europe 
have been influenced and coined by philosophical reflections on law and particu­
larly on crim inal law. A  second aspect might also have become clear, however. 
Philosophical reflections do not determine legal solutions and institutions in a ll 
details; their field and their strength is the rational decision o f fundamental ques­
tions, the proof that certain principles and institutions are necessary and reason­
able. W ithin this frame, space remains for different solutions in detail -  space for 
tradition, national or regional law culture and pragmatism.
What are the consequences o f that for the role o f philosophy in the discussion 
about the future o f law and particularly o f crim inal law in Europe? Can philoso­
phy be an advisor in answering the questions whether, and if  it should be done, to 
which extent and into which direction it is sensible to harmonize or even stand­
ardize crim inal law in Europe?
A t first glance, the correct answer seems to be “no” : How shall the philosophy 
o f law be able to tell us how to deal sensibly with divergences o f national law 
when these divergences are just the consequence o f the lim ited guidance o f philo­
sophical reflections concerning the content o f good law?
But we should not be rash in our judgement. The insights o f philosophical 
thinking about law don’t amount to telling us which material contents and prin­
ciples o f law could reasonably have to be called good law. Philosophy o f law also 
tells us something about conditions o f effectiveness and validity o f law and about 
the status which knowledge and acceptance o f law as well as culture o f applica­
tion do have for observance and effectiveness o f law.54 These recognitions are to 
be considered when one wants to give a reasonable answer to the question o f 
“whether” partially differing laws should be harmonized or standardized. Partial-
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ly differing, but in their field o f application well known, accepted and well func­
tioning codes might be better law than highly harmonized or even standardized 
codes which come for parts o f the people partially unexpected, are only little 
known and accepted and therefore badly observed and applied.33
I f it is -  taking this also into consideration -  after all reasonable to harmonize 
the law in certain fields, something further should be observed: The harmonized 
or standardized law coming out at the end should also correspond to certain rules 
o f procedure and specific conditions -  namely those rules o f procedure and those 
formal conditions that are to be followed to get well accepted law when the par­
ticipants o f legal discourse have diverging starting points. Insofar philosophy o f 
law can give a series o f insights that should be observed.36
We have to leave it w ith these brief comments. It would be a new topic and it 
would need an own contribution to clarify the importance o f philosophical in­
sights into law for harmonization or standardization o f crim inal law in Europe in 
detail.
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